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In the study of the evolution of cooperation, resource limitations are usually assumed just to provide a
ﬁnite population size. Recently, however, agent-based models have pointed out that resource limitation may
modify the original structure of the interactions and allow for the survival of unconditional cooperators in
well-mixed populations. Here, we present analytical simpliﬁed versions of two types of agent-based models
recently published: one in which the limiting resource constrains the ability of reproduction of individuals but
not their survival, and a second one where the limiting resource is necessary for both reproduction and survival.
One ﬁnds that the analytical models display, with a few differences, the same qualitative behavior of the more
complex agent-based models. In addition, the analytical models allow us to expand the study and identify the
dimensionless parameters governing the ﬁnal fate of the system, such as coexistence of cooperators and defectors,
or dominance of defectors or of cooperators. We provide a detailed analysis of the occurring phase transitions as
these parameters are varied.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.85.066112 PACS number(s): 89.75.Fb, 89.65.−s, 02.50.−r
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperation is common in nature and is considered to
have played a key role in the evolutionary appearance of
higher selective units, such as eukaryotic cells or multicellular
life, from simpler components [1]. However, its abundance is
intriguing because cooperators are vulnerable to exploitation
by defectors [2–4]. Several mechanisms have been found
allowing cooperative behaviors to survive such as network
structure, group selection, direct and indirect reciprocity,
or tag-based donation [5,6]. Behavioral mechanisms—such
as the latter three examples—require players to have some
ability to avoid the exploitation from defectors, such as
memory or the capacity to recognize the coplayer [5,6]. As
a consequence, simple agents without these abilities, such
as unconditional cooperators, are not expected to survive in
well-mixed populations.
Aside from a few examples [7–10], the role played by
the limitation of resources in most studies on the origin
and persistence of cooperation has been just to impose a
constant population size [5,6,11–16]. Recently, however, we
have introduced a different viewpoint where the environment
is considered explicitly by introducing a resource ﬂux into
the system that drives it away from equilibrium [17,18].
This standpoint leads to unexpected outcomes, such as that
resource limitation allows for stable coexistence between
unconditional cooperators and defectors, and even dominance
of cooperation, in well-mixed populations playing an a priori
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, where defectors are expected
to drive cooperators to extinction [12]. This happens due to
a selforganizing process involving the environment which
generates dynamical payoffs transforming the original PD
structure into a different game.
Two main scenarios can be devised for the limiting
resource: (a) the latter is necessary for reproduction but not
for survival (such as for instance, any substance required for
the development of the embryo) as analyzed in [17] or (b) it is
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necessary for both reproduction and survival (such as sugars
and some other nutrients), as analyzed in [18]. In both cases,
agent-based models showed that cooperation could survive
for some parameter values. The purpose of this paper is to
develop simpliﬁed analytical models capturing the mecha-
nisms involved in the agent-based models. This will supply
a more complete view of the model behavior and will provide
the dimensionless groups ruling the dynamics. We show that
the analytical models yield a similar qualitative behavior
as the agent-based models, although with a few differences.
The paper is organized as follows: In Sec. II, we analyze the
case where the limiting resource constrains reproduction but
not survival.Wepresent themodel, its corresponding equations
and analyze with detail their solutions and phase transitions.
Section III performs a similar analysis for the case where the
limiting resource constrains both reproduction and survival.
Section IV is devoted to conclusions.
II. LIMITING RESOURCE CONSTRAINING
REPRODUCTION
A. Simplified analytical model
We develop here an analytical model aiming to mimic
the model of Ref. [17]. For the paper to be self-contained,
we provide a summary of the latter model. It consists of an
evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating individuals
that receive resources from the environment and exchanges
resources during interactions. No memory, learning abilities,
or any other sensory inputs are assumed. Each individual i
is represented by its internal amount of resources Ei and its
strategy; namely, cooperate (C) or defect (D). The internal
amount of resources may be interpreted as the amount that
belongs to it, independently of why or how. The environment
provides resources in portions E0 per unit time to randomly
chosen individuals independently of their strategy, thus not
modifying the structure of the payoffs; the total resource inﬂux
ET is assumed to be constant, so that E0 = ET /N , with N
being the population number. If the amount of resources of
an individual exceeds a value Es , it splits into two identical
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copies with half its internal amount of resources. Deaths occur
with probability f per unit time. Defectors are characterized
by the maximum amount of resources associated with an
interaction: the cost spent (Ec) for stealing a reward (Er )
from the coplayer. If the internal resources of a defector are
smaller than the cost Ec, it does not pay the cost nor receive
the reward. If the interaction partner has resources below the
reward, the entire amount of resources is sequestered. Thus,
the quantities associated with the defector strategy represent
the ideal outcome of the interactions. We assume that these
quantities are inherited without mutation. Large populations
with Er > Ec > 0 were considered, so that the system plays
a priori a PD game [17].
In the simpliﬁed model, the internal amount of resources
Ei is either 0 or 1. Each defector attacks at a rate α per
unit time to individuals chosen at random and steals its
internal resources. To do so, the defector must have internal
resources greater than 0 (i.e., Ei = 1), otherwise it does
not attack. In every interaction, the defector loses its unit
of resources with probability q, which can thus be seen as
the average cost paid by a defector in an interaction. If the
interaction partner has no resources, no reward is obtained.
Cooperators do nothing; they just eventually suffer from the
attacks of defectors. Let us note that, in an ideal situationwhere
all individuals possess resources (Ei = 1), the payoffs for
cooperators and defectors in an interaction between them are
respectively fCD = −1, fDC = 1 − q; interactions between
cooperators result in a payoff fCC = 0 for each, and between
defectors the payoff is fDD = −q. The payoff ordering in
this situation, fDC > fCC > fDD > fCD , corresponds to a
prisoner’s dilemma, and hence the names cooperators and
defectors, and the expectation of the extinction of cooperation.
However, since not all cooperators have resources Ei = 1, the
average net reward gotten by defectors will be, in general,
smaller than 1 − q. This reward depends on the fraction of
cooperators in state Ei = 1, which is a dynamical quantity. As
a consequence, the dynamics might lead the average reward to
values smaller or equal to the cost and allow for the survival
of cooperators, as we will see below.
The system receives from the environment ET units of
resources per unit time, which are distributed equally among
the N individuals of the population independently of its
strategy, thus not modifying the interaction payoff structure.
When an individual with internal resources Ei = 1 receives an
extra unit of resources it splits into two identical copies, each
one with Ei = 1. Along with reproduction, we assume that
players die with a probability f per unit time, independently
of their strategy. Therefore, resource allocation, reproduction,
and death rules are equal for both cooperators and defectors,
the only difference being the strategy.
At the sight of the twomodels, themain differences between
them are that in the simpliﬁed model the resource distribution
is discrete (while it is continuous in the agent-based model),
and defector cost is stochastic.
We consider simultaneous interactions and large popula-
tions so that we can make a continuum approach. We denote
by c0 and c1 the number of cooperators with internal resources
0 and 1, d1 and d0 the number of defectors with internal
resources 1 and 0, respectively;N = c0 + c1 + d1 + d0 is then
the total population size. The evolution equations according to
the mechanisms involved are
dc0
dt
= αd1 c1
N
− ET
N
c0 − f c0, (1)
dc1
dt
= −αd1 c1
N
+ ET
N
(c0 + c1) − f c1, (2)
dd1
dt
= α(1 − q)d1 c1
N
− αqd1
(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)
+ ET
N
(d0 + d1) − f d1, (3)
dd0
dt
= α(1 − q)d1 d1
N
+ αqd1
(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)
−ET
N
d0 − f d0. (4)
Let us ﬁrst explain the interaction terms. From theα attacks per
unit time of a defector D1, in a fraction c1/N the victim will be
a C1 player. Thus, αd1c1/N describes the rate of interactions
of active defectors D1 with cooperators C1. As a result of
these interactions, individuals C1 lose their internal resource
unit after the attack of defectors and move from population
c1 to c0; this explains the ﬁrst term in the equations for c0
and c1. Also, in a fraction 1 − q of these interactions the D1
individual keeps its resource unit, which added to the stolen
unit from the C1 player, leads to its reproduction; this gives the
ﬁrst term in the equation for d1. When a D1 player attacks C0
and D0 individuals, a fraction q of times loses its resource unit
so that it moves to populationD0 (this yields part of the second
term in equations for d1 and d0). Finally, an interaction D1D1
produces either D1D0 with probability q (which reduces the
D1 population and increases D0), or D1D1D0 with probability
1 − q, which does not affect the population of d1 but increases
the one of d0; these two processes describe the remaining
interaction terms in the dynamic equations for d1 and d0.
On the other hand, the term in ET /Nc0
quantiﬁes the number of individuals C0 moving
to population C1 after getting a unit of resources
from the environment. In addition, individuals in population
c1 that receive resources from the environment replicate, thus
increasing the c1 population. The same applies for the popula-
tion of defectors d0 and d1. The terms with f just describe the
number of individuals dying in each population per unit time.
This model is much simpler than the one described in [17],
because it contains just four independent variables; namely,
c0, c1, d1, and d0, in contrast to the many variables included
in the resource distributions for cooperators and defectors of
the latter model. However, it keeps most of its ingredients and
captures the main features of its behavior: the promotion of
cooperation triggered by resource limitations.
B. Model dynamics
One of the properties of the model in [17] is that a change
in the resource inﬂux ET does not modify the ﬁnal fate of the
system, but just the ﬁnal population size; more speciﬁcally, it
was found in equilibrium that N ∝ ET . This is also what the
system (1)–(4) predicts for the steady state, since the right-hand
side of all the equations are homogeneous functions of degree
1 of variables ci, di, N , andET . This means that the stationary
states are solutions of the type ci, di = λiET , with λi constants
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Time evolution for scaled number of cooperators (solid line) and number of defectors (dashed line) for two sets of
parameter values: q = 0.7 and (a) α/f = 1 and (b) α/f = 10. In (a) cooperators die out; in (b) the system ends up in a mixed state where
cooperators and defectors coexist. These two types of states are the only attractors of the dynamics. The populations are given in units of ET /f
[see Eq. (5)].
depending only on α, f , and q; therefore, N ∝ ET as in the
previous model.
One can obtain a further understanding of the model
through nondimensionalization. By dividing Eqs. (1)–(4) by
the death rate f and deﬁning the dimensionless time f t ,
the system turns out to be described by three dimensionless
parameters; namely, q, α/f , and ET /f . Since we have seen
above that stationary populations are proportional to ET , they
can be generally written as
ci,di = gi
(
q,
α
f
)
ET
f
, (5)
with gi being unknown functions of the dimensionless param-
eters q and α/f . Then, ET /f sets the characteristic size of the
populations, and the composition (let us say the population
fractions ci/N, di/N) comes determined by the other two
parameters, q and α/f through functions gi . Parameter α/f
has a direct interpretation: since α is the attack rate of a
defector and f −1 is the average lifetime of an individual, α/f
denotes the average number of interactions performed by an
active defector, and it is this quantity, along with the cost q,
that determines the fate of the system. For simplicity, in the
following we will assume ET = 1 (i.e., absolute populations
ci, di will be given in units of ET ).
The most interesting feature of the model in [17] was
the existence of situations where cooperators are able to
survive in coexistence with defectors in mixed stationary
states; otherwise the population reaches a stationary state with
only defectors. We analyze next the dynamical behavior of
Eqs. (1)–(4) through its numerical and analytical resolution.
Figure 1 illustrates that the dynamic equations (1)–(4) indeed
display a behavior similar to that of the original model;
namely, by modifying parameters α, f , and q the system
ends up either in purely defective states or in coexistence
states. One can perform a systematic analysis of the dynamic
behavior of our system (1)–(4) which will allow for a better
understanding of the model. Its analytical resolution shows the
existence of a number of stationary states: (a) onemade only of
cooperators C1, which the dynamics shows is always unstable;
(b) another one made only of defectors, which is sometimes
stable [we give it here for completeness: d1 = 1/(αq + f ),
d0 = (
√
1 + α/f − 1)/(αq + f )], and (c) a number of mixed
states of which only one provides positive values for all
population variables for some parameters. The latter is the
mixed state that, when it takes positive values, becomes stable
at the same time that the defective state (b) becomes unstable.
In order to study this (transcritical) transition, it is useful to
realize that the populations for cooperators in the mixed state
(c) have the following form (the solutions for defectors are
always positive):
ci = ai
α
[
α
f
− γc
]
, (6)
where ai (i = 0,1) and γc are functions of q only. This
expression supplies positive values for ci only when α/f > γc.
Therefore, γc(q) is the critical value above which α/f must be
in order for the system to end up in a coexistence state. This
indicates that the transition fromdefective states to coexistence
states depends on the parameter α/f , and not separately on
parameters α and f , in agreement with Eq. (5). Figure 2
shows the phase transition from dominance of defectors to
coexistence of cooperators and defectors for two values of
q. One observes that the survival of cooperation is favored
by larger defector costs (larger q), as expected, since mixed
states appear at lower critical numbers of α/f . One can also
display the phase transition as a function of q for two values
of α/f (Fig. 3). One observes that, as q → 1, the mixed state
tends to the stationary state made only of cooperators C1,
which is the stable state for q = 1. Finally, one can obtain the
phase diagram separating the two behaviors in terms of the two
parameters governing the system. The separation line is found
by imposing ci = 0 in Eq. (6) (i.e., α/f = γc). The analytical
expression for γc is long but it can be solved numerically (see
Fig. 4).
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Phase transition to coexistence. Fraction of cooperators (c1/N , solid line; c0/N , dotted line) as a function of
parameter α/f for (a) q = 0.5 and (b) q = 0.7. Below a critical value, cooperators die out.
C. Comparison with agent-based model
The phase diagram, Fig. 4, shows that cooperation is
favored at large defector costs q, as expected, and also for
large numbers of attacks in a lifetime, α/f . The latter behavior
is surprising, since at ﬁrst sight interactions should beneﬁt
defectors versus cooperators. However, we must bear in mind
that attacks are indiscriminate and then a fraction of the
attacks fall on defectors themselves, thus reducing the number
of defectors in active states. The dynamics of the system
shows that, for a sufﬁciently large number of attacks in a
lifetime, the number of active defectors decrease enough so
as to allow for the survival of cooperators. This happens in a
continuous phase transition, as seen in Figs. 2 and 3. Let us note
that the latter behavior was partially observed in the original
agent-based model. There, the attacking rate α was set to unity
by construction of the model, so that it could not be modiﬁed.
However, it was found that cooperation increased when the
death rate f decreased, in agreement with the predictions of
the present model.
Let us further compare the agent-based model in [17]
and the simpliﬁed analytical model presented here. As pre-
viously noticed, they show a similar qualitative behavior, both
displaying a phase transition from purely defective states at
low costs and large death rates to stable coexistence states
in the opposite limit. However, there exist a few differences
between them. The numerical simulations of the former model
predicted dominance of cooperators for large costs (see Fig. 2
in Ref. [17]), whereas this does not occur in the analytical
model. We have checked this difference of behavior by
performing large-size simulations of the agent-based model,
thus minimizing ﬁnite size effects; they conﬁrm the extinction
of defectors for large costs, and the existence of a region where
they extinguish due to stochastic ﬂuctuations in coexistence
states with few defectors.
III. LIMITING RESOURCES CONSTRAINING
REPRODUCTION AND SURVIVAL
In this section we provide an analytical model for the study
of a well-mixed population of unconditional cooperators and
defectors which exchange resources among them and with the
environment but, in contrast to the previous section, here the
resource limits not only the reproduction of individuals but also
their survival. A more complex, agent-based model, analyzing
this situation was presented in [18]. Again, the model consists
of an evolving well-mixed population of self-replicating
FIG. 3. (Color online) Phase transition to coexistence. Fraction of cooperators (c1/N , solid line; c0/N , dotted line) and defectors (dashed
line) as a function of parameter q for (a) α/f = 1 and (b) α/f = 10. Below a critical value, cooperators die out.
066112-4
ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR WELL-MIXED POPULATIONS . . . PHYSICAL REVIEW E 85, 066112 (2012)
FIG. 4. Phase diagram. For large costs q or large average number
of attacks in a lifetime, α/f , cooperators survive in coexistence with
defectors.
individuals that receive resources from the environment and
exchange resources during interactions. Everything works as
in the previous model except in two issues: (i) now individuals
do not die at random, but when individuals exhaust their
resources, and (ii) each individual dissipates an amount El
of resources per unit time in order to keep alive.
A. Analytical model
The simpliﬁedmodel follows the same spirit as the previous
section. The internal resources of individuals are either 0 or 1.
Each defector attacks at a rate α individuals chosen at random
and steals their internal resources. To do so, the defector
must have internal resources greater than 0 (i.e., Ei = 1).
In every interaction, the defector loses its unit of resources
with probability q, which is thus the average cost paid by a
defector in an interaction. The system receives resources from
the environment at a rate ET , and they are distributed equally
among theN individuals of the population independently of its
strategy. In addition, individuals dissipate resources in living
activities at a rate r; this is implemented as the probability of
spending one resource unit per unit time. If an individual with
0 internal resources is attacked or it is required to dissipate
resources it dies. On the other side, when an individual with
internal resources Ei = 1 receives an extra unit of resources it
splits into two identical copies, each one with Ei = 1. Again,
resource allocation, reproduction, and death rules are equal
for both cooperators and defectors, the strategy being the only
difference.
Let us note that the main differences between the model
presented here and the latter model are again that (a) now
there are only two resource levels Ei = 0,1, instead of a much
larger distribution, (b) the cost paid by active defectors in an
interaction and resource dissipation are stochastic.
We use the notation of the previous section for the number
of cooperators ci and defectors di . The model equations are
very similar to them:
dc0
dt
= −αd1 c0
N
+ αd1 c1
N
− ET
N
c0 − rc0 + rc1, (7)
dc1
dt
= −αd1 c1
N
+ ET
N
(c0 + c1) − rc1, (8)
dd1
dt
= α(1 − q)d1 c1
N
− αqd1
(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)
+ ET
N
(d0 + d1) − rd1, (9)
dd0
dt
= −αd1 d0
N
+ α(1 − q)d1 d1
N
+ αqd1
(
c0 + d0 + d1
N
)
−ET
N
d0 − rd0 + rd1. (10)
The interaction terms are as in Eqs. (1)–(4), with the exception
of the ﬁrst term in the equations for c0 and d0, describing deaths
due to interactions. In addition, dissipation kills individuals c0
and d0 at a rate r and moves individuals from c1 to c0, and
from d1 to d0 also at a rate r .
B. Model dynamics
One can analyze the dynamical behavior of our model
equations (7)–(10) following a scheme analogous to that
followed in the previous section. Since the right-hand side of
the system equations are homogeneous functions of ci, di and
ET , the stationary populations ci, di are proportional to ET .
Therefore, ET just determines the population size, but not the
composition. This is in agreement with the behavior found in
the agent-based model [18]. One can also nondimensionalize
FIG. 5. (Color online) Time evolution for scaled number of cooperators (solid line) and number of defectors (dashed line) for three sets of
parameter values: α/r = 1 and (a) q = 0.6, (b) q = 0.7, and (c) q = 0.8. In (a) cooperators die out; in (b) the system ends up in a mixed state
where cooperators and defectors coexist; in (c) cooperators get rid of defectors. Two phase transitions occur as q increases. The populations
are given in units of ET /r [see Eq. (11)].
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Phase transitions for α/r = 10. Population
of defectors (dashed line) and cooperators (solid line) as function of
defectors cost q. As q grows, two phase transitions occur: ﬁrst, a
transition fromdefective to coexistence states, and second, a transition
at q = 0.723 from coexistence to purely cooperator states.
the system equations by deﬁning a nondimensional time rt .
This shows that the system is ruled by three nondimensional
parameters: q, α/r , andET /r and, analogously to the previous
section, the stationary populations obey the scaling relation
ci,di = gi
(
q,
α
r
)
ET
r
. (11)
Again, ET /r provides the characteristic size of populations
ci, di ; this is larger for bigger resource inﬂux rates ET and for
smaller dissipation rate r . On the other hand, the composition
of the ﬁnal population is determined by parameters q and α/r .
The numerical resolution of the system (7)–(10) displays
two main behaviors depending on the parameter values:
dominance of defection and dominance of cooperation (see
Fig. 5), in agreement with the behavior of the agent-based
model [18], and in contrast to the case where the limiting
resources just affect reproduction and not survival discussed
in the previous section. Figure 5(b) shows that coexistence
of cooperators and defectors is also possible, in opposition
to the behavior of the more complex agent-based model.
Again, Fig. 5 shows that the ﬁnal composition of the system
changes as a parameter is varied, indicating a phase transition
from a population of only defectors at small costs q and a
population of only cooperators at larger q values, separated by
a coexistence region (see Fig. 6). Let us analyze the parameter
region where each attractor becomes the stable one; that is, let
us ﬁnd the phase diagram of the model.
The analytical resolution of the system reveals the ex-
istence of three stationary states: (a) one made of coop-
erators (c1 = ET /r, c0 = 0.62ET /r), (b) one made of de-
fectors [d1 = ET /(αq + r), d0 = ET [(α2 + 5r2 + 6αr)1/2 −
r − α]/[2r(αq + r)] ], and (c) a mixed state whose solution
provides positive solutions only for a limited set of parameter
values. The whole solution is rather cumbersome, but one can
extract valuable information by focusing on some aspects of
it. The solution for c1 is (ET = 1)
c1 = 2.62αq
2 − 1.62qα + 3.62qr − 2.62r
qα(1 − q) , (12)
FIG. 7. Phase diagram. Below q = 0.62 defectors dominate.
Above q = 0.72 cooperators dominate. In between there is a thin
region of coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
which is positive provided that
α
r
= 1 − 1.38q
q(q − 0.62) > 0. (13)
This shows that the mixed state can only exist in a thin
range of q values between 0.62 and 0.72, in agreement with
Fig. 5(b). The same happens for solution c0. Populations
d0 and d1 become negative at q > 0.72. Expression (13)
provides the separation line between dominance of defectors
and coexistence; for q > 0.72 cooperators dominate (see Fig.
6). Therefore, the dynamics is mainly ruled by the defector
cost q, because defectors become dominant below q = 0.62
and cooperators above q = 0.72 (Fig. 7). Aside from the thin
range of coexistence in the parameter region separating both
dominating behaviors, the analytical model thus provides the
same qualitative behavior as the agent-based model presented
in [18].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have studied the dynamics of two
analytical models describing the evolution of well-mixed
populations of unconditional cooperators and defectors under
limiting resources. These models try to capture the essence of
two separate agent-based models dealing with two different
situations. In one of them, the limiting resource restricts the
ability of individuals to reproduce but do not alter their survival
conditions. In the other, the resource rules both the survival
and reproduction of individuals. The main differences of the
models introduced here and the agent-based models are, on
the one hand, that the distribution of internal resources is
limited to two states, instead of a continuous distribution and,
on the other, that the cost paid by defectors is now a stochastic
process.
Analytical models have the advantage with respect to
simulation models of allowing for a complete and more
compact analysis of their behavior. Indeed, we have expanded
the study of the agent-based models by separating the time
scales of all the mechanisms in the model. In effect, in the
agent-based models, we assumed equal rates for defector
attacks and the feeding process. Here, in contrast, we consider
different rates for each process. This increases by one the
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number of parameters. However, the nondimensionalization
of the models has permitted us to identify the dimensionless
parameters ruling the model dynamics, a study which is not
easy to perform in agent-based models. As a result, we have
easily seen that the resource inﬂux from the environment
determines the size of the ﬁnal population, but not the
composition of the population, a result that was observed in the
simulations of the agent-based models. The ﬁnal composition
is ruled by two parameters: the average cost paid by defectors
and the number of attacks in a characteristic time.
The behavior of the analytical models resembles very much
that obtained in the corresponding more complex agent-based
models, remarkably allowing for the survival of cooperators
in some regions of the parameter space. When resources limit
only reproduction, cooperators are able to coexist with defec-
tors at larger defector costs and larger number of interactions
in a lifetime. The latter behavior may seem surprising, as
one would expect defector attacks indefectively to beneﬁt
defectors and harm cooperators. However, since attacks are
indiscriminate, a large number of interactions in a lifetime
reduces the number of defectors in active states and eventually
allows for the survival of cooperators. Remarkably, this
process occurs following a phase transition, so that cooperators
are able to survive only when parameters surpass some critical
value. When resources restrict reproduction and survival the
fate of the system is essentially a population of defectors at
small defector costs, and a population of cooperators at large
costs, separated by a thin region of coexistence at intermediate
costs. Aside from the coexistence region, this is the behavior
found in the agent-based model. The origin of this difference
is probably due to the different resource distribution in both
models (discrete in the analytical model and continuous in the
agent-based model).
Finally, the work presented here could be extended by
modifying the way resources are delivered and foraged by
agents. If the mobility of agents is limited, these may have
only the possibility to explore nearby resources and thus not
all the resources provided by the environment would be used.
Therefore, it would be interesting to study the implications
of the limitation of resources including space and to analyze
inhomogeneous distributions of resources. This situation will
probably enhance the survival of cooperators, but it may also
lead to unexpected results.
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